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Principled Fairness and
Regulatory Urgency
Harold Leventhal*
Focusing on the ever-increasing demands made upon regulatory
agencies and the broad discretion granted by Congress to meet those
demands, the author notes the pressures that lead to an administrative preoccupation with efficiency. There are, however, forces inherent in the processes of administrative law that temper such an
approach: the role of Congress in defining an intelligible administrative policy and establishing standards of operation, the flexibility
afforded by the administrative freedom to make individual adjustments within an administrative mandate, and the tendency of the
administrativepractitionerto advocate essential fairness in the resolution of administrative questions. The author concludes that it is
necessary to approach individual controversies with a view towards
the genuine objective of the practice of administrative lav, the balancing of efficiency with principled decisionmaking.

T HAT BRANCH of the Rule of Law which has come to be known
as Administrative Law has staked out a doctrine of principled fairness in the regulatory process.' This is an area in which Professor
Maurice Gulp and I share -a vital interest-jurisprudence that -permits
officials and agencies to address complex and often harrowing problems of government with dispatch and resourcefulness, with a sound
combination of general principle and individual discretion, and yet
retains the safeguards of fairness and accountability that distinguish
responsible government from some unholy combination of petty
bureaucracy and tyranny.
The march of events and the emergence of new and seemingly
ever more complicated problems for governmental handling tax our
diligence and resourcefulness. Rampant peacetime inflation, energy
crises, and environmental degradation spring to mind. Whether
these problems should be addressed with government programs that
culminate in detailed regulatory controls presents an overarching
question of policy that is not within the province of my remarks. But
it may be helpful to set down a few reflections on the essential administrative law components of a sound regulatory fabric.
*

United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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I shall refer to the experience, which I shared with Maurice Culp,
of the lawyers who carried out the Government's price stabilization
2
efforts during World War H, or "price lawyers," as we were known.
These were formative years for me and, they have resonated in my
professional life as a lawyer and a judge, and in the life of Maurice
Culp, I am confident, as a professor of law.
It may be appropriate, at this juncture, to recall and reaffirm
what I wrote in 1946 when I prepared one of the volumes of the
history of the Office of Price Administration (OPA).3 After quoting
from Justice Rutledge that war and emergencies compel "invention
of legal.

.

. tools

adequate for the times' necessity," 4 I observed:

The legal tools evolved and applied by the price lawyers as part of the Government's wartime fight against inflation will for most of them endure as their most satisfying
experience as lawyers .... They were doing legal work
which was novel, absorbing, significant and, in the fullest
sense of the term, rewarding. 5
REQUIREMENT OF INTELLIGIBLE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

I.

AS AVOIDING A "BLANK CHECK" TO THE EXECUTIVE

A.

Broad Delegation by the Legislature

To discuss the requirement of principled fairness in administrative law, one must begin at the beginning, with the statutes under
which the regulatory process must operate. Statutory mandates frequently-and in the case of grave new problems, typically-vest
enormous discretion in executive authority. For example, when in
August 1970, Congress concluded that "inflation is still on a rampage
in our economy," it empowered the President to "issue such orders
and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents,
2. We overlapped for more than a year in our service with the Office

of Prce Administration during World War II, Mr. Culp serving in the field
as a Regional Price Attorney and I at Headquarters as an Assistant General
Counsel. By the time of the Korean price stabilization, I had been Chief
Counsel of what had then become the Office of Price Stabilization, and the
field charts showed Mr. Culp as Regional Counsel. However, neither of us
was concerned directly with enforcement programs or with such wartime programs as rationing. In both stabilization programs, we served as "price lawyers."
3. Leventhal, The Role of Price Lawyers, in PROBLEMS IN PRIcE CONTROL: LEGAL PHASES 49 (OPA Historical Reports on War Administration

1947).

4. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 461 (1944) (dissenting opin-

ion).

5. Leventhal, supra note 3, at 49.
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wages, and salaries .... ,"6 On August 15, 1971, the President es7
tablished a 90-day freeze of prices, rents, wages, and salaries,
thereby ushering in a stabilization program marked by an array of
retreats, advances, and skirmishes, and giving rise to a variety of approaches to particular problems.
A similar pattern emerged from the Congressional response to the
"energy crisis." On April 30, 1973, Congress authorized the President to "provide

.

.

.for the establishment of priorities of use and

for systematic allocation of supplies of petroleum... to meet the essential needs of various sections of the nation and to prevent anticompetitive effects resulting from shortages of such products." 8 The
following November Congress directed the President to "promulgate
a regulation providing for the mandatory allocation of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and each refined petroleum product. . ...9 The

statute empowered the President to control distribution and to set
prices.
The general economic stabilization laws contained limits, but
these did not derogate the huge discretion conferred on the President-to issue orders "as he deems appropriate"' 0 to stabilize prices,
and to determine allocation of a soarce resource "to meet the essential needs of various sections of the nation."'" The limitation forbidding the President from stabilizing prices -ata level less than that prevailing in May 1970, was academic, as a practical matter, even when
the law was passed in August 1970, and certainly when the price
freeze was issued in 1971.
The Emergency Petroleum Act purported to require the President to promulgate an allocative oil regulation, but the broad discretion that was conferred permitted extensive reliance on the market
mechanism for allocation, a policy approximating nonintervention.
A long list of considerations to be taken into account by the Executive
6. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202, 84
Stat. 799.
7. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (1971).
8. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28,
§ 2(b)(3), 87 Stat. 27.
9. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 4
(a), 87 Stat. 629 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (Supp. 11, 1973)).
10. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L No. 92-210,
§ 2, 85 Stat. 744, amending Economic Stabilizization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-379, § 203, 84 Stat. 800.

11. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28,
§ 2(a), 87 Stat. 27, amending Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L
No. 91-379, § 202, 84 Stat. 799.
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in prescribing the allocation was set forth in the Petroleum Act."2
This was of the kind frequently encountered in congressional legislation-a number of objectives, typically broadly-drawn, often competing, with a soulful inscription that the Executive establish order and
harmony, promoting each objective "to the maximum extent practicable."' 13 But such a listing of factors does nothing to limit the
broad grant of authority provided at the outset. Professor Davis captures the spirit of statutes of this kind when he characterizes them
' 4
as saying to the Executive: "Here is the problem. Deal with it."'
Broad congressional delegation to the Executive is unremarkable,
even at a time like the present, when there is much criticism and
self-criticism to the effect that Congress has given the Executive too
much latitude. The pattern is one we have come to recognize and
tolerate as well-nigh inevitable. Yet the reality that executive power
comes to be exercised by subordinate officials, responsible to the
electorate only indirectly, is vaguely disquieting, for accountability is
attenuated by the low visibility of many of the decisions that make
up the administrative effort. Judge Friendly has noted that lodging
broad discretionary power in such officials is at odds with the spirit
of-though there are now few instances in which it would be said
to violate-the Constitution's vesting of legislative power in Congress.' 6 Broad legislative delegation of power raises the specter of
officials exercising "purely personal and arbitrary power," in conflict
with our basic principles of law and liberty, of government and sovereignty. 16 It raises the specter of "regulatory inconsistency," of "un12. The list includes: "protection of the public health, safety, and welfare
. and the national defense"; "maintenance of all public services"; "maintenance of agricultural operations"; "preservation of an economically sound
and competitive petroleum industry"; full capacity operation of refineries;
"equitable distribution" of petroleum products among geographic regions, firms
and users; encouragement of exploration for and extraction of new supplies;
"economic efficiency"; and "minimization of economic distortion inflexibility,
and unnecessary interference with market mechanisms." 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)
(1) (Supp. Tr, 1973).
13. Id.
14. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsn § 2.03, at 82 (1958).
15. H. :FiENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIvE AGENCIES: THE NEED
FOR A BETrER DEFIMNION OF STANDARDS 21-22 (1962).
16. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886).
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions
of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest,
and review the history of their development, we are constrained to
conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of
course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but
in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies

of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom
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equal treatment of like cases." '17
These concerns once found expression in the decisions holding
statutes unconstitutional as delegations of legislative power.18 But
the doctrine embodied in these decisions made a distinction between
",legislative" and "executive" functions that was artificial, and its
sanction of invalidating the statutory grant of power was viewed as
too unwieldy an instrument of control.
The contemporary approach is one not of invalidating even the
broadest statutory delegations of power, but of assuring that they are
accompanied by adequate controls on subsequent administrative behavior. This approach takes account of the structure within which
decisions or rules will be made, the degree to which considerations
involved will be disclosed, and the incentives that will work toward
equal treatment of those similarly situated. 19
When the Supreme Court upheld -the broad delegations in the
1942 price stabilization law, it focused on whether Congress had sufficiently identified the field entrusted to the -administrator for action
"so that it may be known whether he 'has kept within it in compliance
with the legislative will." 20 And when I came to author Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,2 ' which became the leading opinion
upholding the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 against a challenge

of excessive delegation, the judicial lens focused on the dynamics of
the ongoing exercise of executive authority:
and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the
definition and limitation of power.... For, the very idea that one
man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will
of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
Id.
17. R. NOLL, REFomiNG REGuLATION 38 (1971):
A number of defects of regulation are related to the vagueness of
the regulatory mandate: unequal treatment of like cases, additional
uncertainty introduced by regulatory inconsistency, elaborate legal
procedures since each case is essentially a new law, and a much heavier case load since a past adverse decision does not adequately deter
raising an issue again.
18. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
19. Professor Davis has advocated this approach as a substitute for the
delegation doctrine, see Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHr. L
REv.713 (1969).
20. Yakus v.United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
21. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). Plaintiff filed notice of appeal of
the decision on November 19, 1971. Plaintiff's later motion for leave to withdraw notice of appeal was granted by a three-judge district court on March
22, 1972.
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Concepts of control and accountability define the constitutional requirement. The principle permitting a delegation of legislative power, if there has been sufficient demarcation of the field to permit a judgment whether the
agency has kept within the legislative will, establishes a
principle of accountability under which compatibility with
the legislative design may be ascertained
not only by Con22
gress but by the courts and the public.
Turning aside a hard-pressed contention that the 1970 Act gave
the Executive a "blank check," the court construed that Act in the
context of prior stabilization laws, as denying authority to be unfair
and inequitable. 23 The opinion stressed the role of ongoing administrative standards:
Another feature that blunts the "blank check" rhetoric
is the requirement that any action taken by the Executive
under the law, subsequent to the freeze, must be in accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive.
This requirement, inherent in the Rule of Law and implicit
in the Act, means that however broad the discretion of the
Executive at the outset, the standards once developed limit
the latitude of subsequent executive action.
The requirement of subsidiary administrative policy,
enabling Congress, the courts and the public to assess the
Executive's adherence to the ultimate legislative standard,
is in furtherance of the purpose of the constitutional objective of accountability. This 1970 Act gives broadest latitude to the Executive. Certainly there is no requirement
of formal findings. But there is an on-going requirement
of intelligible administrative policy that is corollary to and
implementing of the legislature's ultimate standard and objective. 24
B.

Disclosure of Underlying Administrative Policy
in Emergency Conditions

As Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,25 a recent opinion
surveying significant aspects of the Rule of Administrative Law,
points out, "the applicable doctrine that has evolved with the enormous growth and significance of administrative determination in the
past forty or fifty years has insisted on reasoned decision-making." 2 6
22. Id. at 746.
23. Id. at 754-58.
24. Id. at 758-59.
25. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

26. Id. at 852.
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This requirement goes beyond the preliminary obligation that determinations shall be public and the threshold need for reasonable
procedure. The additional constraint of disclosure of the policies and
reasons underlying the Executive's determination provides important
strengths to the regulatory process and assurances against abuse:
[1t] tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate
general standards, applied without unreasonable incrimination.
[I]t rather underlines . . . the need for conjunc-

tion of articulated standards and reflective findings, in furtherance of even-handed application of law, rather than
impermissible whim, improper influence, or misplaced
zeal. Reasoned decision promotes results in the public interest by requiring the agency to focus on the values served
by its decision, and hence releasing the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice. It furthers the
broad public interest of enabling the public to repose confidence in the27process as well as the judgments of its decision-makers.
These basic -principles were voiced in the requirements associated
with adjudicatory determinations, after full panoplied hearings cast
in a judicial mold.28 The same principles, though reconciled with
administrative convenience, are still applicable in informal rulemaking, where the only procedure is that of notice of the proposed
rule and opportunity to interested persons to submit written com29
ments.
Informal notice-and-comment rule-making has been described as
"one of the greatest inventions of modem government." 30 It strikes
a new balance-providing fewer individual safeguards, and stressing
expedition flexibility, and economy of governmental resources. But
the new balance -retains the requirement of reasoned determination,
for while an agency need not provide the formal findings that Congress requires be made in the record of 'adjudications, the agency is
instructed that it "shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their 'basis and purpose." 3 ' As Judge McGowan
27. Id. at 851-52 (footnotes omitted).
28. See particularly the Chenery litigation: SEC
U.S. 80 (1943); and 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
29. Section 4(b) of the Administrative Procedure
§ 553(c) (1970).
30. 1 K. DAvis, ADMInsTRATIvE LAW TREATIs
1970).
31. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C.

v. Chenery Corp., 318
Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C.
§ 6.15, at 283 (Supp.
§ 553(c) (1970).
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has noted in Automotive Parts & Accessories Association v. Boyd,32
despite the significant divergence from the adjudicatory model, the
retention of disclosure of reasons for action permits retention of a
"searching and strict" review of whether the action is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. 33 He observes: "The paramount objective
is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legislative task to
perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of rules for
general application in the future. '3 4 Even in the case of low-visibility informal agency action, which is neither rule-making nor adjudication and for which contemporaneous public explanation is either
lacking or minimal, a lawsuit challenging the action as arbitrary and
contrary to law opens the door for the court to obtain further explanations from the officials involved, with provision for trial appearance
or deposition if necessary. 35
Should the key ingredient of reasoned appraisal be dropped when
an official or agency is concerned with emergency problems and the
need for novel solutions? Thus far, at least, the answer is in the negative. One hesitates to speak in absolutes; even habeas corpus may
be suspended in case of invasion. But at least in conditions where
ongoing crises demand that the Government undertake social welfare
activities, rather than employ military forces, our nation's law has
preserved the essential elements of the reasoned decision making requirement as a bulwark for its citizens.
Even the process of accommodating the nation's economy to the
exigencies of war production embodied the essence of reasoned decision. Section 2(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
required that every maximum price regulation or order "shall be accompanied by a statement of the considerations involved in the issuance of such regulation or order." 3 6 This provision for statements
of considerations was in my first draft as initial draftsman of the price
control legislation. It was derived from Justice Stone's then-recent
opinion in Opp Cotton Mills v. Administratorof the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor,3 7 and it was in due course
relied on in Chief Justice Stone's opinion upholding the law in Yakus
32. 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
33. Id. at 338.

34. Id.
35. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
36. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 2(a), 56 Stat. 25.

37. 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
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v. United States.3 8 In his dissent, however, Justice Roberts dismissed
the requirement for statements of considerations as a mere advice of
the Price Administrator's reasons for action, which lacked the quality of a finding of fact,3 9 and which left such broad discretion "that
this Act creates personal government -bya petty tyrant instead of gov'40
ernment by law."
In fact, the Statements of Considerations called for effort and resources. They were printed and disseminated to the public and filed
in the Federal Register. 41 Their content reflected a continuing process of adjustment within the agency. In the absence of a notice and
comment procedure there was, of necessity, a heavy reliance on consultations with industry advisory committees. At least in the earliest
days, the lawyers were typically pressing for programs to obtain and
disclose more factual data. An early memorandum for collection of
extensive data was developed on the basis of price control experience
in the mining and manufacturing industries, but it proved less workable in the food industries where the principal crises of 1942 developed. There was a major shift of emphasis during 1942 as the OPA
moved from regulations for specific industries to general maximum
price regulation.
The process of reasoned disposition accompanied amendments
and requests for amendments of price regulations. Statements of
considerations were of course required when maximum price regulations were -amended, and groups seeking changes could be called on
to support their claims. There was also provision -for reasoned disposition when requests were denied. The Act provided that a party
challenging a regulation as invalid, and not merely appealing to
agency discretion, could file a "protest," and on any denial could litigate validity in the Emergency Court of Appeals. The denial of a
protest was accompanied by an opinion, leading the Emergency
Court of Appeals to characterize the protest proceeding as "judicial
in character. ' 42 More accurately, the administrative consideration of
a "protest" had a dual character. There was an administrative process to consider whether the protest should be granted in whole or in
38. 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
39. Id. at 452-53.
40. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 537 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).

41. The urging of the OPA lawyers that they be reprinted in the Federal
Register was not accepted prior to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
42. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bowles, 138 F.2d 669, 671 (Emer. Ct.

App. 1943).
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part; if the protest were to be granted, how and for what reasons
had to be set forth in the accompanying statement of considerations.
And then there was preparation for court review, with the lawyers
specifically assigned to that litigation concerned that in the event of
denial of the protest, the administrative record should be adequate to
pass court muster. The non-lawyer administrators who manned
OPA's various commodity branches were more concerned with current operations and once it was determined to deny these protests,
were not eager to commit their time and energies to what seemed
essentially a vindication of the past rather than a coping with the
present. The price lawyers, who served as their staff legal advisors,
acted as intermediaries.
The program for statements of considerations was uneven in its
development and application. But in broad outline it served the purpose of assuring a nation faced with new, pervasive, vexing, and awesome economic controls that the several actions of the Washington
bureaucrats reflected an effort to grapple with the hard problems.
Furthermore, the program illustrated that even under emergency
conditions, the fundamental principle of reasoned decision-making did
not have to be abandoned.
II.

INDIVIDUAL

ADJUSTMENTS

AND EXCEPTIONS

Although the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 validated
regulations that were "generally fair and equitable," Congress also
provided in section 2(c) that any price regulation could embody
"adjustments and reasonable exceptions.1 43 An increasingly large
part of OPA's resources had to be devoted to individual requests for
relief, usually on the ground of hardship. This practice proceeded
apace after the General Maximum Price Regulation was issued in
April 1942, especially since the controls on wage and labor costs,
grounded in statute in October 1942, were not as tight as price control measures.
These provisions were a necessary adjunct to the regulatory process. The initial price regulations were often "first cuts" at a problem,
resolving an uncertainty and staking out how the agency would exercise its powers. Businesses were grouped according to a few similarities, and a single policy was made applicable. Exceptions and adjustments were the safety valve 'by which salient differences between
parties initially treated alike could be exposed and evaluated.
43. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 2(c), 56 Stat. 26.
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The most obvious ground for adjustments, and the one which first
appeared, was an inordinately high production cost faced by a firm
whose output was essential for war production. Granting adjustment
to the high-cost producer at the margin enabled the OPA to avoid
the difficulties that had beset price control during World War I, when
the Government's effort to cover costs of necessary marginal producers allowed enormous profits for the intramarginal (lower-cost) producers. Allowing these excess profits would have undercut public
willingness to accept constraints and limitations in the larger interest
of stabilization.
A related but distinct adjustment came later, when an expansion
of production was vital to the war effort. A price adjustment frequently had to cover "costs plus" the profit needed as incentive to
induce new production. Later adjustments were provided where
valid regulations did not allow recouping the costs of a newly-introduced commodity. Adjustment was usually allowed where the novelty of the product was substantial, and it was not simply an effort
to evade price control by "repackaging." Hardship with respect to
a substantially new product occasioned relief, even where the product
was not vital to the war effort, when greater austerity might have
led to collapse of the entire enterprise.
The wartime experience provided a salutary lesson on the importance of adjustment machinery as a necessary component of a sound,
effective, and just general regulatory program. In a 1964 article on
the Federal Power Commission's area natural gas price program,
written after the hearing examiner proposed his decision in the lead
proceeding on the Permian Basin rates, I noted the absence of any
mechanism for relief to high-cost producers, an omission especially
startling if these producers were required, under public utility concepts, to continue service. I proposed an adjustment provision,
which could be given "relatively limited scope. .

.

. But the adjust-

'44
ment would still be there as a safety valve."
In its final Permian Basin area gas order, the Federal Power
Commission adopted an adjustment provision, declaring that a producer should be permitted "appropriate relief" if it established that
"out-of-pocket expenses in connection with the operation of a particular well" would exceed revenue for that well under the applicable
area price. 45 This relief provision was prominent in the Supreme

44. Leventhal, Reviewing the Permian Basin Area Gas Price Hearings,
73 PuB. UTni. FORT., March 12, 1964, at 19.
45. 34 F.P.C. 159, 226 (1965).
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Court opinion in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,4 6 which upheld
the concept of area rate regulation for natural gas. Disagreeing with
the conclusion of the court of appeals that the adjustment was vague
and elusive, Justice Harlan declared:
It would doubtless be desirable if the Commission provided, as quickly as may be prudent, a more precise summary of its conditions for special relief, but it was not obliged to delay area regulation until such guidelines could
be properly drawn. The Commission quite reasonably believed that the terms of any exceptional relief should be
developed as its experience with area regulation lengthens.
Moreover, area regulation of producer prices is avowedly
still experimental in its terms and uncertain in its ultimate
consequences. .... 47
The possibility of -adjustments or exceptions in cases of special
hardship, or unforeseen circumstances, has come to be viewed as an
essential safety valve of the regulatory process. General rules, which
may stress simplicity and administrative convenience, cannot take
into account all of the varieties and complexities of individual instances. Rules will be upheld as generally reasonable even though
in some applications they may "grind with a rough edge," and "hardship" adjustments will not be granted, at least where the enterprise
as a whole is not plunged into chaos or ruin. 48 But provision for adjustments and exceptions keeps regulation from becoming procrustean. As Judge Wright has written, "A tyranny of petty bureaucrats
who lack the power to change the rules even an iota in order to do
justice is at least as bad as a tyranny of petty bureaucrats who make
up the rules as they go along." 49
The legal significance of the complementary roles of general rules
and individual adjustments was developed in WAIT Radio v. FCC.50
This was the case of a broadcaster, limited to daytime broadcasting
by the FCC's "clear chaunel" rule, who sought an exception on
grounds of enhancement of service. The FCC denied exemption
with a perfunctory opinion and the broadcaster sought review. In
remanding for a more thorough statement of the reasons for denying
exemption, the court stated:
46. 390 U.S. 747 -(1968).
47. Id. at 771-72.
48. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hickel, 435 F.2d 440, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
("We think the Board did not abuse its discretion when it sought to reserve
the 'exceptional hardship' provision for cases of financial distress, so as to assure that the adjustment would not swallow up the program.")
49. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALn LJ. 575, 576 (1972).
50. 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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[A] rule is more likely to be undercut if it does not in
some way take into account considerations of hardship,
equity, or more effective implementation of overall policy,
considerations that an agency cannot realistically ignore, at
least on a continuing basis. The limited safety valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective regulation. 51
The court concluded that the FCC's waiver procedure was not "a
step-child, but. . an important member of the family of administrative procedures, one that helps the family stay together." 5 2
A related theme appears in a contemporary context, the Clean
Air Act's limitation of automobile emissions. The Act mandates
emission standards for 1975 and 1976 model cars, but permits the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to grant an
exemption for 1975 models, after making requisite findings.5 3 Reviewing the Administrator's denial of a suspension in May 1972, the
court of appeals examined the congressional purpose in providing for
suspension and concluded that it had the character of an "'escape
hatch' . . . establishing a context supportive of the rigor and firmness of the basic standards slated -for no later than 1976.1' 54 The
court perceived that the Administrator had not been sensitive to this
role of the exemption:
In our view the overall legislative firmness does not necessarily require a "hard-nosed" approach to the application
for suspension, as the Administrator apparently supposed,
and may indeed be furthered by our more moderate view
of the suspension issue, particularly in assigning to the Administrator the burden of producing a reasoned presentation of the reliability of his methodology. This is not a
matter of clemency, but rather a benign approach that
moderates -the "shock treatment" so as to obviate excessive
and unnecessary risk of harm.5 5
Care must be taken that the rule be proved and not swallowed
by the exception--or suspension, exemption, or adjustment. A
safety valve is one thing, a dissipation of all force another. Care
must also be taken lest exemptions and adjustments be granted waywardly and willy-nilly, justified by little more than the exigencies or
protests of 'the day.
51. Id. at 1159.
52. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(b)(5) (1970).
54. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
55. Id.
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The problem, though vexing, is one vigorous administrators can
usually be expected to 'bear well in mind, but evenhandedness in the
dispensation of hardship relief is elusive. Words like "waiver" (and
"exemption" and "exception") raise the hackles of those who suspect
favoritism. Their influence in the direction of moderation and overall fairness in the administrative process presupposes that relief will
be dispensed pursuant to a standard of appropriate generality and
neutrality.
In the OPA the price lawyers sought to prevent individual adjustments from degenerating into a system of favors for special pleaders
by insisting on a firm rule: the basis for relief in exceptions and
adjustment orders had to be embodied in a general standard. No
applicant received relief from a price regulation unless a general provision in the regulation authorized it; alternatively, one who met the
general conditions specified was entitled to relief as a matter of right,
not of administrative privilege. 56 This principle had its cost-delay
of meritorious cases until the particular application could be molded
into an adjustment principle of neutral application-but was well
worth it. An agency whose success consisted of delaying, and hence
moderating, inflationary pressures could not help but generate resentments, but faithful adherence to a requirement of general adjustment provisions served to avoid any climate of discriminatory
treatment and instilled in the public the confidence necessary to the
agency's function. As I observed in writing for 'the OPA's history:
[I]n August 1945 the National Retail Dry Goods As[..

sociation attempted to discredit OPA's operations with the
claim that OPA was providing more generous pricing to
new manufacturers than to established producers. It made
a vigorous campaign and called the attention of congressional committees to a "chamber of horrors" exhibit. Yet
even this organization, hostile to OPA and alert for evidence to discredit it, did not claim that the unduly high
prices allegedly granted to new manufacturers were the
product of favoritism, or that the denials of adjustments
were attributable to individual oppression. The adjustment principle tended to prevent the agency from drifting
into the handling
of general price problems on a piece57
meal basis.
Generalized procedures for adjustment or other hardship relief
avoid the risk of a public perception, whether or not well founded,
56. This position was later upheld in Armour & Co. v. Brown, 137 F.2d
233 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943).
57. Leventhal, supra note 3, at 102.
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that relief is given only to those with clamor and clout. With such
a perception, voices grow ever more clamorous, and the appeal to
a grin-and-bear-it citizen philosophy is weakened.
In a related movement in the law, the courts have called on
agencies, though they have refrained from mandates, to enlarge the
use of rule-making procedures rather than to rely on case by case
adjudication to develop standards and policies. There are various
reasons for these suggestions, including the advantage that the procedure will admit many interested parties rather than limit participation
in the evolution of regulatory principles. Another significant advantage of the rule-making course is this, that ". . . an excessively individuated approach may be a seed bed that is too favorable to the
rank weed of discrimination." 5 8 Announcement of general, neutral
rules to govern access even to an escape hatch alerts all entitled to
its use to its availability and instills in those denied egress the confidence that such passage has not arbitrarily been blocked. The need
for such confidence stands high even, or perhaps especially, when
government intervenes on problems of urgency. Cries of "crisis" and
appeals to patriotism and sacrifice do not still the desire for equal
treatment and guarantees against arbitrary action.

III.

THE ROLE OF LAWYERS

In October 1971, I delivered a lecture on "The Lawyer in Government." It was one of the Fiftieth Anniversary Lectures of the
General Accounting Office on "Improving Management for More Effective Government." 59 I drew on my experience as a judge, as a
practicing lawyer, and as a lawyer within the Government, including
my days at OPA. In conclusion, I voiced the thought that attention
to principles of standards and evenhanded administration improves
effectiveness even in the narrow sense of the term:
[If] you work with standards you work faster than
if you work without. . . [I]f you just handle each individual case as it comes, you will find yourself scratching
around with so many contradictions and uncertainties that
you will have lost time. Also, if you work with standards,
you perhaps have some positions to put forward at annual
60
grilling time.
58. City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
59. Leventhal, The Lawyer in Government, in IMPROViNo MANAGEMENT
FOR MORE EFFEcnVE GoVERNmENT 101 (1972).

60. Id. at 114. The "grilling time" referred to appearances before legisla-

tive committees. I should also add the not inconsiderable grilling experienced
by officials of the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and
Budget) on submission of a proposed budget.
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More important is the need of a larger perspective. The doctrine
of separation of powers may be inefficient in the short run, but as
Chief Justice Burger well stated, "Efficiency must never be the primary objective of a -free people."6 1 The lawyer in government who
devotes his skills to assuring reasoned and evenhanded dispositions
assures higher values, a protection against concentration of power.
"In the last analysis, that assures greater ability in the society to
adapt to changing conditions, with a free spirit and interchange
62
among the elements of society."
"The Government lawyer has a continuing, constructive, creative
role."6 3 Indeed, government lawyers have many roles, calling on
their training, honed analytical powers, word precision, and feel for
structure and procedures. These embrace drafting and interpreting
statutes, implementing regulations, and proposing and resisting
amendments. These skills help the Executive and the Congress to
cope effectively with problems and prepare for changes. But perhaps their most important function, derived from skills, background,
and tradition, lies in rendering service like that of the chancellor, also
known as the king's conscience. Less drained by the pace of dayto-day administration and more attuned to the need for underlying
general standards, the lawyer has an institutional role to play, as advocate of the principled fairness that must be taken into account in
governmental determinations. Others may espouse the urgency of
other considerations government action may serve-efficient allocation of a scarce resource, guaranteeing continued production, avoiding a sudden employment dislocation. The lawyer must be attuned
as well to the overarching interest in principled fairness, an interest
more diffused and lacking a persistent clientele whose voices could
offset those clamoring for action.
In times of crisis, there are manifold pressures for shortcuts.
These cannot be ignored, and they may call for modifications of ideal
but time-consuming procedures. What remains as an imperative, in
the face of urgencies and emergencies, is the need for principled regulation.
61. Address by Chief Justice Burger, Ceremonies Dedicating Georgetown
University Law Center, Sept. 17, 1971, cited in Leventhal, supra note 59, at
114.
62. Leventhal, supra note 59, at 114.
63. Id. at 110.

